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Abstract. In this paper, the current state of security in robotics is
described to be in need of review. When we consider safety mechanisms
implemented in an Internet-connected robot, the requirement of safety
becomes a crucial security requirement. Upon review of the current state
of security in the field of robotics, four key requirements are in need of
addressing: the supply chain for calibration, integrity and authenticity
of commands (i.e. in teleoperation), physical-plane security and finally,
secure, controlled logging and auditing.
1 Introduction
Robotics has taken a graceful leap into a wide range of application areas,
including but not limited to autonomous vehicles, and surgical and indus-
trial robotics. The use of robotics in these areas brings forth the potential
to increase the efficiency of output, as well as the accuracy of operations.
In the area of surgical robotics, a high level of accuracy and precision is
a key factor, which, in the context of surgery, in some cases could mean
the difference between life and death. Reuters published an article [1] that
states the shipments for robots increased by nearly 16% from 2017, where
shipments increased in every sector other than the automotive industry.
An increase in shipments of robots and their corresponding components,
ultimately corresponds to an increase in robotic installations, each of
which are becoming Internet-connected. Whilst robots traditionally pose
many safety challenges, becoming Internet-connected exposes the robots
to cyber attacks which can result in safety-critical events, and thus safety
problems now become a security concern.
2 Background
2.1 Surgical Robotics
In the case of surgical robotics, there are robots which are configured
based on pre-planned operations, such as bone-milling robots like Ro-
bodoc [2], as well as robot systems which are directly teleoperated by the
surgeon, such as RAVEN II [3] and the da Vinci surgical system [4].
Preoperative planning robots, like Robodoc, consist of a planning
computer workstation and a robotic arm with an instrument, such as
a high-speed milling device, as an end effector [5]. Before these robots
were introduced, there was a need to address the inability to optimally fit
implants into the bone of patients, as there are many factors which can
impact the fitting of implants, including accurately sizing the implant and
the precise positioning of the implant within the bone. As a result, preop-
erative planning robots designed for bone milling were introduced, which
have shown to be feasible and provide successful surgery for implants,
with a reduction in the number of post-surgery complications such as re-
jection of the implants and bone fractures. The precision and accuracy
that these robots provide, allows for better bone milling at optimal speeds
and locations which, due to a computer-operated preoperative planning
system, is suitable for a wider variety of implant-related surgeries.
Teleoperated surgical robotic systems, such as da Vinci, provides med-
ical professional with robot-assistance in procedures, to improve surgical
performance. The da Vinci robot is a widely used surgical robot system,
which is a quadbrachical (four-arm) robot, which is operated by a surgeon
via a surgeon’s console. The surgeon’s console consists of finger controllers
that translates human movements into instructions the robot can inter-
pret. The RAVEN II surgical system consists of two surgical arms, but the
motor chassis (base) allows two RAVEN II surgical robots to be mounted
on either side of the surgery site [6]. Similarly, both of these robots are
coupled with a surgical console, that provides feedback to the surgeon,
such as by providing a 3D view of the surgical site.
Noticeably, with a comparison of both the RAVEN II and da Vinci
robots, whose architectures span a majority of surgical robots, we can
deduce that a key component across all surgical robotic systems is the
surgeon’s console. In the case of preoperative planning robots used in
surgery, the console can be compared to the planning computer, where
feedback to the surgeon’s console such as radiography images (x rays,
etc.) and robotic movements are used as input to the robot pre-surgery.
In a preoperative procedure, the surgical console is started and primed,
and allowed to self-test itself, where it recognises its various compo-
nents [4]. The cameras used in the surgical suite are black and white
balanced and calibrated to a cross bar, as well as other factors such as
the height are set to comfortable levels for the surgeon. Camera and arm
movements are tested, and the system is left to stand by.
2
2.2 Industrial Robotics
Industrial robots accompany a large portion of installed robotics systems,
which range from aiding in collection, production and packing of food
products [7], to the automotive industry. An experimental security anal-
ysis of industrial robots [8] shows that the majority of industrial robot
architectures are extremely similar to surgical robot architectures. More
specifically, industrial robot systems can be compared to teleoperated sur-
gical robots, where the industrial robot is paired with a controller (pen-
dant) that allow the robot to be both operated by human operators as
well as autonomously. There is a main control system which links the con-
troller, inter-connected components and the network in which the robot
operates. Another comparison to surgical robotics, the control system is
regarded as one of the most safety- and security-critical components. The
components of the robot system communicate with each other using an
internal robot network, and the robot system is connected to a dedicated
organisational subnet or the Internet via a service network; similar to the
da Vinci surgical system. Traditional industrial robots are paired with a
teach pendant that allows the robot to perform simple repetitive tasks,
without any sensor feedback. The authors in [9] describe a system to
achieve coordinated task-based control for an industrial robot, which has
a rotating torso and two seven degree-of-freedom arms to perform grasp-
ing tasks and object manipulation teleoperatively. Traditional robots are
limited by a timing delay between the issuing of commands and the cor-
responding robotic action, but the authors show that the use of sensors
allow the robot motion to be controlled with collision avoidance, object
identification and locating. As well as this, using sensors and machine
learning provide the robot with force-feedback control, where located ob-
jects can be securely held with enough force to prevent the object slipping,
by estimating the weight and center of gravity of the object as well as
its position. Another example of embedded sensors in an industrial robot
is described in [7], where the robot system uses cameras and sensors for
constructing a 3D model used in automatic pruning of grape vines. The
cameras of this robot are calibrated using standard methods and the
robot-to-camera transform is computed by attaching a calibration target
to the robot arm. To cut canes, a mill-end is attached to a 100W 24,000
RPM brushless DC motor on the arm. The 3D model is optimised using
AI techniques and is used to update the robot’s trajectory so that its six
degree-of-freedom arm can reach the required vine cuts accurately.
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2.3 Autonomous and Unmanned Vehicles
To a general audience, autonomous vehicles are primarily viewed as cars
or other highway vehicles, yet this term is further classified. Autonomous
vehicles can also be classified into civilian aircraft, trains, Unmanned Sea
and Surface Vehicles (USVs), and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) [10].
Although the architectures of autonomous vehicles may differ among
classes, they all utilise common components, such as cameras, sensors,
GPS, etc. – somewhat similar to surgical and industrial robots. These
common components are heavily relied on, to aid with actions such as
real-time manoeuvring decisions.
For autonomous cars, many in-built functions, such as enabling/disabling
the brakes, are controlled by Electrical Control Units (ECUs), which are
interconnected by the Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol [11]. Orig-
inally designed in the 1980s, the CAN bus is still the most widely used
in-vehicle bus to date, due to its cost efficiency [12]. As well as this, a large
proportion of autonomous systems can be directly addressed via cellular
networks, and the Internet. In an autonomous vehicle, a combination of
the ECUs in the vehicle are interconnected via the CAN bus, and thus
we can portray autonomous vehicles to consist of a multi-agent system
architecture, composed of one or more subsystems [10]. Similar to surgical
robots, autonomous cars consist of one or more control modules, which
may be connected to the CAN bus such that in can be interconnected
with the ECUs in the vehicle [13].
3 Discussion of Robot Security
Upon exploring the problem space associated with security in three pri-
mary aspects of robotics, we identified key challenges that need to be
addressed.
3.1 Cyber Domain Challenges
Attacks in the cyber domain are ever so present, when we connect robot
systems to the Internet or even an organisation’s network. Alemzadeh et
al. [6] state that cyber domain attacks include the modification of con-
trol commands, without needing to modify the control flow or induce
changes in the performance of the target program. The authors present
attacks that exploit the time of check-time of use (TOCTOU) vulnerabil-
ity, between the safety checks on the commands the actual execution of
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commands. As a result of attacks in the cyber domain, potentially catas-
trophic consequences arise in the physical domain, such as abrupt/jerked
axial movements, which can lead to a reduction in accuracy and precision.
Results like these are extremely hard to notice, unless closely watched by
the operator, and it is hard to distinguish whether the result was due
to a failure in the robot system, or if it was due to a human-induced
failure. The challenges here include ensuring the integrity of commands
whilst in-flight, maintaining the accuracy and precision of robot output,
and providing tamper-resistant logs to maintain a trail of evidence in the
event of failures or anomalous behaviour.
In surgical robotics systems, the key critical component is its elec-
tronic control system [6], which both receives commands form the sur-
geon’s console and translates these into robotic actions, whilst providing
video feedback to the surgeon’s console. Bonaci et al. [14] describe attacks
between the surgeon’s console and the robot itself, which they classify into
three categories: intention modification, intention manipulation, and hi-
jacking attacks. Respectively, these attacks include impacting intended
actions of the surgeon, modifying feedback messages from the robot to
the surgeon’s console, and having the robot ignore the intended actions of
the surgeon and ultimately perform a completely different action. Attacks
such as these further suggest that providing tamper-resistant messages is
important, and because commands are sent in real-time and executed as
soon as they arrive, the integrity of commands must be maintained in-
flight. On top of this, the communication channels between components in
the robot system must not be tampered with, in the sense that messages
within the channel shall not be altered, nor can unauthorised messages
be sent and accepted within the channel.
In the case for industrial robots, with the architectures very similar to
those of surgical robots, the critical component is also the control system.
Industrial robots tend to have components interconnected and commu-
nicate with each other through an internal robot network, as well as a
service network where the robot is connected to a dedicated organisa-
tional subnet and possibly to the Internet [8]. What is challenging, is to
secure robots that are connected to the public Internet, where adversaries
can target the robot (or multiple) from anywhere. On top of this, even
when a robot is connected to the organisational subnet, there is still a
risk of local adversaries that may look to attack the robot in the cyber
domain. Demarinis et al. [15] present results from scanning the entire
IPv4 address space of the Internet for instances of the Robot Operating
System (ROS), which is a widely used robotics platform for research, and
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found that a number of hosts that support ROS are exposed to the public
Internet. They identified that some robots are connected to simulators,
but a number appear to be legitimate robots which are capable of being
teleoperated, such that they can be remotely moved in ways that could
potentially pose risks to both the robot and its surrounding environment,
including human operators. An open ROS master was shown to indicate
a robot whose sensors can be remotely accessed, and who’s actuators
can be remotely controlled. From a single scan, 15 instances of the op-
erating system were identified, with 11 of them located in cloud service
provider networks. Multiple different sensors were also discovered to be in
use by these openly accessible robots, which included laser range finders,
cameras, GPS devices and barometric pressure sensors. Ultimately, the
authors suggest that, at a minimum, the network should be monitored to
detect exposure. The main challenge here is to only allow entities to tele-
operate upon authorisation, whilst either securing or isolating the robot
from the public Internet.
While safety is becoming of increasing importance, the implementa-
tion of safety mechanisms in software establishes higher security require-
ments. Focusing attacks on these safety mechanisms can subsequently
impact the physical domain. Impacts on the operations of the robot it-
self can occur, but also indirect impacts on its operators and surrounding
environment may be ever so present. An indicative example of this re-
lates back to an attack which can cause abrupt, unjust movements in
the robot arms [6]. In this example, the authors uncover an interesting
challenge with the E-stop (emergency stop) software mechanism. This
mechanism can also be hard-wired, but their experiment involved a soft-
ware e-stop mechanism. Assuming that a robot has been compromised,
installing a safety mechanism which can impose a system-wide halt would
be prone to problems. For example, if a rival manufacturing company was
to attack the e-stop software mechanism, they could interrupt the entire
manufacturing process of their competitors. This not only leads back to
the challenges of securing the robot itself, but also providing a tamper-
resistant log of evidence, in the event that this may take place; such that
unintended actions can be traced back to the origin of the action.
3.2 Physical domain challenges
Aside from challenges that arise in the cyber domain, we must also con-
sider attacks in the physical domain; as the connected robots consist of
both cyber and physical components which cooperate to enable smooth
operation in the real world.
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First, we must consider physical compromise. The availability of these
robots is regarded as a property of uttermost importance, which is unfor-
tunately also the most easily influenced. For example, an adversary who
targets an autonomous vehicle with a jamming attack, focusing on the
optical channels, could induce an emergency stop resulting in a denial-of-
service (DoS) attack. Aside from jamming attacks, even tampering with
a sensor or replacing it with an unauthorised sensor could provide images
with unintended perturbations or of low quality, which can result in poor
misclassification of objects in a robots perceived environment. Therefore,
we must consider the challenges of not only mitigating the effects of jam-
ming attacks, but also avoid unauthorised equipment to be added (or
in replacement of another) to robots. Furthermore, it is also a challenge
to ensure only authenticated components are in place to ensure that the
robot and its components behave and perform as intended.
As well as safety mechanisms implemented in software, we must also
discuss challenges posed by safety mechanisms in the physical domain.
Industrial robots have been discussed for use in construction [16], which
poses many interesting challenges, as construction work invokes higher
requirements for flexibility and adaptability, compared to traditional in-
dustrial robot solutions. The working environment in construction is ever
changing, with humans potentially cooperating aside the robot itself, and
materials coming in and out of the robots perceived environment. Com-
pared to typical industrial environments, the accuracy of components
and buildings vary and are relatively lower, and thus must be compen-
sated for. Salmi et al. [16] note that using sensors for 3D vision and force
control allow robots to better manage complex environments, as well as
adapt to product variation and adapt process parameters to varying re-
quirements. The use of sensors as a safety mechanism allows for flexible
fenceless safety systems, which is ideal in environments where humans and
robots closely collaborate. However, risks such as collision, compression
and sparks, among others, can occur at different stages of robot opera-
tion (i.e. boot, clearing of disturbances, etc.) even with the use of sensors.
Sensors can be expensive, but [9] shows that off-the-shelf sensor compo-
nents and software can be drawn upon, which can greatly reduce costs.
Using cheaper sensors, albeit a cheaper option, does not guarantee a long
component-life. Furthermore, the calibration of these sensors can pose a
threat to the accuracy and precision of these sensors, and ultimately its
effectiveness as a safety mechanism.
7
3.3 Secure calibration
The calibration of any equipment, including sensors used in AVs or even
the instruments used for surgical robotics, is performed to ensure that
the output of the equipment are of high quality, precision and accuracy,
and low uncertainty. Moreover, the definition of equipment goes further
to also cover cables and resistors that are used in the equipment itself.
To enable this, they are calibrated against a higher standard of accuracy,
to identify the margin of errors in output. Calibration is also performed
to meet quality audit requirements, and ensure reference designs, subsys-
tems and integrated systems perform as intended. After calibration is per-
formed, a calibration certificate is produced as an output, which outlines
the measurement uncertainty, error margins and precision under certain
environmental conditions (dependent on calibration), amongst others. A
piece of equipment’s calibration and uncertainty should be traceable to
corresponding SI units, to a standard or reference method [17] – produc-
ing a chain of equipment and associated calibration certificates, leading
to the SI units. We can define a simple traceability chain for a sensor,
where the sensor is calibrated at one or more intermediate calibration
facility, against one or more calibration units. These calibration units
are themselves calibrated against some master calibration units, and this
continues until we reach calibration performed at National Measurement
Institutes (NMIs), which use calibration units that are calibrated against
the SI units; providing the highest levels of accuracy and lowest levels
of uncertainty. As we move from the NMIs at the top of the chain, the
accuracy decreases and uncertainty increases, but equipment at each level
should have a set uncertainty; which should be maintained.
The challenges associated with robot equipment are ensuring that all
its components are correctly calibrated, whilst maintaining the integrity
of calibration and certificates. Aside from integrity, we must also ensure
that for some equipment, i.e. a sensor, its traceability chain is unbroken.
Specifically, if one master unit in its traceability chain is out of calibra-
tion (needing recalibration) or was calibrated incorrectly, all subsequent
equipment/units downwards from that point should effectively be recali-
brated.
As well as challenges associated with implemented safety mechanisms
of robots, Quarta et al. [8] note a key challenge associated with calibration
parameters. These calibration parameters are an essential construct for
determining factors such as axial positions of the arms, which are used
for compensation for known measurement errors. By manipulating the
calibration parameters, they demonstrated induced effects on the robot’s
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servo motor, causing it to move erratically. This was because the true
error in the measurement signal was in fact different to that which the
controller knew. Calibration parameters for all components in a robot
system may be held by its controller or main computer. If this is the case,
then any potential compromise of the controller or main computer can
subsequently violate the integrity of calibration parameters, thus leading
to potentially anomalous output of sensors or even unintended actions
even if the robot was operated normally.
3.4 Secure boot
Importantly, calibration, configuration and component connections are
all established through the boot process. By tampering with only the
boot process, an adversary could modify the calibration and configura-
tion parameters known by the controller, and potentially force extreme
erratic movements or unsafe robot starting positions. Aside from tam-
pering with the boot process, incorrect calibration, faulty connections,
etc. could result in potentially catastrophic consequences. Therefore, as-
suming a secure boot, the boot process should ensure factors such as
authentic component connections and valid calibration, before the robot
can operate safely.
3.5 Summary of challenges
Overall, we have established a number of challenges that arise in security
of robotics, from cyber and physical domain challenges, to further refined
challenges in the calibration of interconnected components such as sensors
and even cables used to connect components.
1. Ensuring the integrity and authenticity of commands, even whilst in-
flight.
2. Maintaining tamper-resistant logs and trails of evidence, for auditing
and locating sources of failures and anomalous/unsafe behaviour.
3. Securing communication channels from tampering commands, adver-
sarial input, and eavesdropping.
4. Securing the teleoperability of robots – only authorised entities can
teleoperate, even if a robot is connected to the public Internet or an
organisation’s subnet.
5. Mitigation of physical plane attacks, such as jamming and signal sat-
uration attacks.
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6. Ensuring only authentic and authorised equipment is in place, to en-
sure no physical tampering occurs. This includes sensors, and actua-
tors, while going even further to include components such as power
and ethernet cables.
7. Maintaining valid calibration for all components in a robot system, to
ensure high accuracy and precision, and low uncertainty (low margin
of error from calibration).
8. Maintaining the integrity of calibration certificates and stored cali-
bration/configuration.
9. Securing the boot process (startup).
4 The Requirement for a Progressive Shift in Robot
Security
Upon discussion of the challenges associated with robot security, we pro-
pose a number of research questions which are to be further explored.
Supply chain for calibration: First, how can we secure the supply
chain, before a robot is produced? The majority of components that make
up a robot system have a calibration a chain, which means that they
have a calibration certificate detailing accuracy, precision and margins of
error. Thus, it is a requirement to ensure that the calibration of these
components is up-to-date and performed correctly and to international
standards [18]. Furthermore, not only should the calibration of a com-
ponent be valid, the calibration of all calibration units that supersedes
must also be valid such that the traceability chain remains unbroken. If
part of this chain is broken, all subsequent members of the chain must
be recalibrated. In a real-world scenario, assuming a sensor was out-of-
calibration, the robot may perform less efficiently or incorrectly classify
sensed objects; and such the question of whether the robot should still
be in operation becomes of question. This can be taken a step further,
and the proper calibration of a robot can be determined in a secure boot
process which ultimately determines whether a robot can start or not.
Integrity and authenticity of commands (i.e. from teleopera-
tion), even whilst in-flight: Bonaci et al. [14] describe an attack which
impacts a surgeon’s intended actions and modifying in-flight packets. Do-
ing so could result in the robot assuming a surgeon’s commands are valid
and ultimately perform a consequential action targeting a patient. As a
solution to attacks against the integrity and authenticity of commands,
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the authors propose a number of challenges to be addressed. First, tele-
operated robots execute commands as soon as they are received, and thus
if an adversary was to flood the robot with packets, it may start behav-
ing abnormally. Not only would this pose a risk to a patient, but also to
the robot and its environment. As a minimum requirement, they propose
that assurance of legitimate sources of commands should be maintained
and to limit a robot’s processing rate to a specific amount to protect the
robot and its environment from harm.
Physical plane security: Assuming that we have a secure supply chain,
once the robot is produced and ready to be used, how can we ensure it is
physically secure? We must first ensure that robots are able to maintain
relatively normal operation even under adversarial threats. For example,
if jamming or signal saturation attacks are in place to disrupt a driverless
vehicle, we must mitigate the effects of these attacks as best as possi-
ble, to enable the vehicle to continue driving regularly. On top of this, we
must ensure that all interconnected components of a robot system are au-
thentic and allowed to be there. Specifically, we must ensure that sensors
installed during production have not been changed unless the change was
authorised and logged securely. This would help prevent faulty compo-
nents being used, as well as preventing an adversary from implementing a
modified component for their benefit. For example, if a UAV was captured
in a battlefield scenario, an attacker may modify its GPS component so
it provides incorrect information to the owner of the UAV. Furthermore,
even cables can be used maliciously. USB cables can seemingly be legit-
imate, yet an attacker can modify the USB cables to inject malware, as
demonstrated by Nohl and Lell [19]. Therefore, it is a requirement to
ensure that all components are authentic and that even component con-
nections should be authorised. For example, a challenge should be made
to verify that a cable is allowed to be attached to an Ethernet port. Fi-
nally, robots should also be securely maintained. This can pose a difficult
requirement to address, as some robots operate remotely or are always
running, and therefore it is difficult to perform maintenance on a live
robot. Can we patch the robot, even whilst it is in operation, without
disrupting its operability? Can we, securely and safely, lock or shutdown
the robot in the event of compromise or abnormal behaviour?
Secure, controlled logging and auditing: The need for tamper-
resistant logs is a valuable requirement, which can provide a trail of evi-
dence in catastrophic events, for example to locate the source of potential
11
problems. As well as this, logs are also used for auditing - which is an es-
sential event that occurs regularly within the calibration infrastructure.
There has been several research papers focusing on append-only [20],
tamper-evident [21] and tamper-resistant logs [22] and secure audit log-
ging, which primarily focus on publicly verifiable audit logs [23,24,25,26]
for distributed systems. However, there is little work done on privacy-
preserving audit logging. At the least, work on privacy-preserving audit
logging focuses on inter-domain audit logging [27,28,29], but in a robotics
environment, with multiple levels each of different security requirements
(i.e. confidentiality and integrity), it is important to establish a framework
for cross-domain, multi-level, privacy-preserving audit logging.
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